COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (2025)

COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (1)

COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (2)

  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (3)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (4)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (5)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (6)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (7)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (8)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (9)
  • COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (10)
 

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RETURN DATE: JULY 28, 2020 : SUPERIOR COURTCHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH : J.D. OF MIDDLESEXvs : AT MIDDLETOWNMICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, ETAL : JUNE 22, 2020COMPLAINTFIRST COUNT (As to defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKOM, NegligencelL. The plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, is an individual who,at the time of this accident, was residing at 17 Woodland Road, Deep River, Connecticut.2. The defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, is an individual who, at thetime of this accident, was residing at 89 Maple Avenue, Uncasville, Connecticut.3: On September 11, 2018 at approximately 4:27 p.m., the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHERWEYMOUTH, was the owner and operator of a 2012 Kawasaki, Ex650ec, bearing ConnecticutLicense Plate No. BOSM8.4. On said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKCOM, was the operator of a 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, bearing Connecticut LicensePlate No.: L7605L, which vehicle was owned by the defendant, THE YELLOW CAB GARAGECOMPANY, INCORPORATED, hereinafter referred to as “YELLOW CAB”.5. On said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKCOM, was the operator of a 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, bearing Connecticut LicensePlate No.: L7605L, which vehicle was owned, possessed and/or controlled by the defendant, CURTINMOTOR LIVERY SERVICE, INCORPORATED, hereinafter referred to as “CURTIN MOTOR”.6. On said date and at said time, the motorcycle owned and operated by plaintiff,CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, in the Town ofEssex, State of Connecticut.Te On Said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKOM,was operating the 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, as agent, servant and/or representative of thedefendant, YELLOW CAB, and/or was operating said motor vehicle during the course of heremployment with said defendant.8. On said date and at said time, the vehicle owned by defendant YELLOW CAB andoperated by defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, was traveling in an easterly directionon Main Street, in the Town of Essex, Connecticut when she realized that North Main Street had beenclosed.io: On said date and at said time, while the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKOM, pulled her vehicle over and stopped in front of Ivory Street, at which time she began tomake a U-turn in front of the plaintiff, causing his motorcycle to strike the left side of the defendant’svehicle, thereby causing the injuries, damages and losses more hereinafter specifically set forth.10. Said accident was directly and proximately caused by the carelessness andnegligence of the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, in one or more of the followingways:a. She made an improper turn at the intersection mentioned herein,in violation of Section 14-241 of the Connecticut General Statutes;b. She failed to stay in her proper lane of travel in violation of Section 14-236of the Connecticut General Statutes;c. She failed to maintain a proper look-out;d. She failed to have said vehicle under such reasonable control as to enable herto stop or steer it to avoid the collision;e. She failed to timely apply her brakes in order to avoid the collision;f. She failed to sound her horn or give the plaintiff a timely warning,or any warning whatsoever, of the impending collision;g. She failed to turn her vehicle in time to avoid a collision; andh. She failed to operate said vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner.ll. As a result of the aforesaid collision, the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,has sustained the following injuries, some or all of which are or may be permanent in nature:a. Injury to the neck, consisting of a cervical sprain/strain, and discherniations at C3-C4, C5-6 and C6-7, with accompanying paresthesiasto the right upper extremity in the CS-T1 distribution requiringdecompression with either disc replacement and/or fusion surgery;b. Injury to the mid back, consisting of a thoracic sprain/strain;c. Injury to the low back, consisting of a lumbar sprain/strain;d. Injury to the right chest wall, consisting of bruising, pain and discomfort;e. Injury to the left arm, consisting of left brachial plexopathy and left ulnarnerve axonal motor neuropathy at the elbow; and a near complete fullthickness rotator cuff tear involving the distal supraspinatus tendon, frayingalong the undersurface of the superior labrum and degenerative change atthe AC joint and impingement syndrome requiring left shoulder surgery.f.. Injury to the head, consisting of post-concussion syndrome, includingvertigo and post-traumatic headaches.12. As a result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, said plaintiff has incurred expenses for prescriptions, physicians' services, medicalsupplies, physiotherapy, and hospitalization.13; As a further result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, the plaintiff has lost earnings from his employment, his earning capacity has been impairedand will continue to be impaired in the future.14. As a result of the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff was unable and remainsunable to participate in and enjoy his usual activities.SECOND COUNT (As to defendant, THE YELLOW CAB GARAGE COMPANY,INCORPORATED)1, The plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, is an individual who,at the time of this accident, was residing at 17 Woodland Road, Deep River, Connecticut.2, The defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, is an individual who, at thetime of this accident, was residing at 89 Maple Avenue, Uncasville, Connecticut.Bi The defendant, YELLOW CAB GARAGE COMPANY, INCORPORATED,hereinafter referred to as “YELLOW CAB”, is a Connecticut Corporation, authorized to conductbusiness within and for the State of Connecticut.4. On September 11, 2018 at approximately 4:27 p.m., the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHERWEYMOUTH, was the owner and operator of a 2012 Kawasaki, Ex650ec, bearing ConnecticutLicense Plate No. BOSM8.5. On said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKCOM, was the operator of a 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, bearing Connecticut LicensePlate No.: L7605L, which vehicle was owned by the defendant, THE YELLOW CAB GARAGECOMPANY, INCORPORATED, hereinafter referred to as “YELLOW CAB”.6. On said date and at said time, the motorcycle owned and operated by plaintiff,CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, in the Town ofEssex, State of Connecticut.7. On Said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKOM,was operating the 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, as agent, servant and/or representative of thedefendant, YELLOW CAB, and/or was operating said motor vehicle during the course of heremployment with said defendant.8. On said date and at said time, the vehicle owned by defendant YELLOW CAB andoperated by defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, was traveling in an easterly directionon Main Street, in the Town of Essex, Connecticut when she realized that North Main Street had beenclosed.9. On said date and at said time, while the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKOM, pulled her vehicle over and stopped in front of Ivory Street, at which time she began tomake a U-turn in front of the plaintiff, causing his motorcycle to strike the left side of the defendant’svehicle, thereby causing the injuries, damages and losses more hereinafter specifically set forth.10. Said accident was directly and proximately caused by the carelessness andnegligence of the defendant, YELLOW CAB, who is liable for the acts of its agent, defendant,MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, in one or more of the following ways:a. In that its agent made an improper turn at the intersection mentionedherein, in violation of Section 14-241 of the Connecticut General Statutes;b. In that its agent failed to stay in her proper lane of travel in violation ofSection 14-236 of the Connecticut General Statutes;c. In that its agent failed to maintain a proper look-out;d. In that its agent failed to have said vehicle under such reasonablecontrol as to enable her to stop or steer it to avoid the collision;e. In that its agent failed to timely apply her brakes in order to avoid thecollision;f. In that its agent failed to sound her horn or give the plaintiff a timelywarning, or any warning whatsoever, of the impending collision;g. In that its agent failed to turn her vehicle in time to avoid a collision;andh. In that its agent failed to operate said vehicle in a reasonable andprudent manner.1; As a result of the aforesaid collision, the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,has sustained the following injuries, some or all of which are or may be permanent in nature:a. Injury to the neck, consisting of a cervical sprain/strain, and discherniations at C3-C4, C5-6 and C6-7, with accompanying paresthesiasto the right upper extremity in the CS-T1 distribution requiringdecompression with either disc replacement and/or fusion surgery;b. Injury to the mid back, consisting of a thoracic sprain/strain;iC; Injury to the low back, consisting of a lumbar sprain/strain;d. Injury to the right chest wall, consisting of bruising, pain and discomfort;e Injury to the left arm, consisting of left brachial plexopathy and left ulnarnerve axonal motor neuropathy at the elbow; and a near complete fullthickness rotator cuff tear involving the distal supraspinatus tendon, frayingalong the undersurface of the superior labrum and degenerative change atthe AC joint and impingement syndrome requiring left shoulder surgery.fen Injury to the head, consisting of post-concussion syndrome, includingvertigo and post-traumatic headaches.1B. As a result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, said plaintiff has incurred expenses for prescriptions, physicians’ services, medicalsupplies, physiotherapy, and hospitalization.13. As a further result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, the plaintiff has lost earnings from his employment, his earning capacity has been impairedand will continue to be impaired in the future.14. As a result of the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff was unable and remainsunable to participate in and enjoy his usual activities.THIRD COUNT (As to defendant, CURTIN MOTOR LIVERY SERVICE,INCORPORATED)1. The plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, is an individual who,at the time of this accident, was residing at 17 Woodland Road, Deep River, Connecticut.2 The defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, is an individual who, at thetime of this accident, was residing at 89 Maple Avenue, Uncasville, Connecticut.3. The defendant, CURTAIN MOTOR LIVERY SERVICE, INCORPORATED,hereinafter referred to as “CURTIN MOTOR”, is a Connecticut Corporation, authorized to conductbusiness within and for the State of Connecticut.4. On September 11, 2018 at approximately 4:27 p.m., the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHERWEYMOUTH, was the owner and operator of a 2012 Kawasaki, Ex650ec, bearing ConnecticutLicense Plate No. BOSM8.5). On said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKCOM, as the operator of a 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, bearing Connecticut LicensePlate No.: L7605L, which vehicle was owned, possessed and/or controlled by the defendant, CURTINMOTOR LIVERY SERVICE, INCORPORATED, hereinafter referred to as “CURTIN MOTOR”.6. On said date and at said time, the motorcycle owned and operated by plaintiff,CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH, was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, in the Town ofEssex, State of Connecticut.7. On Said date and at said time, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKOM,was operating the 2008 Ford Econoline E350 Super, as agent, servant and/or representative of thedefendant, CURTIN MOTOR, and/or was operating said motor vehicle during the course of heremployment with said defendant.8. On said date and at said time, the vehicle owned, possessed and/or controlled bydefendant CURTIN MOTOR and operated by defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, wastraveling in an easterly direction on Main Street, in the Town of Essex, Connecticut when she realizedthat North Main Street had been closed.9. On said date and at said time, while the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,was traveling in the easterly direction on Main Street, the defendant, MICHELLE LORRAINEBALKOM, pulled her vehicle over and stopped in front of Ivory Street, at which time she began tomake a U-turn in front of the plaintiff, causing his motorcycle to strike the left side of the defendant’svehicle, thereby causing the injuries, damages and losses more hereinafter specifically set forth.10. Said accident was directly and proximately caused by the carelessness andnegligence of the defendant, CURTIN MOTOR, who is liable for the acts of its agent, defendant,MICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, in one or more of the following ways:a. In that its agent made an improper turn at the intersection mentionedherein, in violation of Section 14-241 of the Connecticut General Statutes;b. In that its agent failed to stay in her proper lane of travel in violation ofSection 14-236 of the Connecticut General Statutes;c. In that its agent failed to maintain a proper look-out;d. In that its agent failed to have said vehicle under such reasonablecontrol as to enable her to stop or steer it to avoid the collision;10e. In that its agent failed to timely apply her brakes in order to avoid thecollision;f. In that its agent failed to sound her horn or give the plaintiff a timelywarning, or any warning whatsoever, of the impending collision;g. In that its agent failed to turn her vehicle in time to avoid a collision;andh. In that its agent failed to operate said vehicle in a reasonable andprudent manner.lis As a result of the aforesaid collision, the plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH,has sustained the following injuries, some or all of which are or may be permanent in nature:a. Injury to the neck, consisting of a cervical sprain/strain, and discherniations at C3-C4, C5-6 and C6-7, with accompanying paresthesiasto the right upper extremity in the C5-T1 distribution requiringdecompression with either disc replacement and/or fusion surgery;b. Injury to the mid back, consisting of a thoracic sprain/strain;c. Injury to the low back, consisting of a lumbar sprain/strain;d. Injury to the right chest wall, consisting of bruising, pain and discomfort;e. Injury to the left arm, consisting of left brachial plexopathy and left ulnarnerve axonal motor neuropathy at the elbow; and a near complete full11thickness rotator cuff tear involving the distal supraspinatus tendon, frayingalong the undersurface of the superior labrum and degenerative change atthe AC joint and impingement syndrome requiring left shoulder surgery.Ea Injury to the head, consisting of post-concussion syndrome, includingvertigo and post-traumatic headaches.12. As a result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, said plaintiff has incurred expenses for prescriptions, physicians’ services, medicalsupplies, physiotherapy, and hospitalization.13. As a further result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the aforesaidcollision, the plaintiff has lost earnings from his employment, his earning capacity has been impairedand will continue to be impaired in the future.14. As a result of the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff was unable and remainsunable to participate in and enjoy his usual activities.WHEREFORE, the plaintiff claims compensatory monetary damageswithin the jurisdiction of this Court. s ey GILLIS, B.C.QGHURCH STREET, SUITE 203HAVEN, CONNECTICUT 06510(203)562-5104 Juris No. 40791112RETURN DATE: JULY 28, 2020 : SUPERIOR COURTCHRISTOPHER WEYMOUTH : J.D. OF MIDDLESEXVv. : AT MIDDLETOWNMICHELLE LORRAINE BALKCOM, ETAL: JUNE 22, 2020STATEMENT OF AMOUNT IN DEMANDThe plaintiff claims monetary damages in excess of FIFTEENTHOUSAND DOLLARS ($15,000.00).THE PLAINTIFF 13

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(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. * * * (g) (1) If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subds. (a), (b), (g)(1).) DISCUSSION A. The first amended complaint The first amended complaint alleges that on October 24, 2020, Plaintiff fell on uneven/unsafe sidewalk at or about 1016 Dayton Avenue in Pomona, California, suffering injuries. B. Plaintiffs motion to compel the deposition of the Citys person most knowledgeable On January 9, 2023 Plaintiff served Request for Production of Documents, Set 1, numbers 1-60, on the City. On May 2, 2023, the City served responses to the requests. On August 22, 2023, the City served further responses to Plaintiffs request for production of documents, set 1, numbers 27 to 29. On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff noticed the deposition of the Citys person most knowledgeable. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff served an amended deposition notice scheduling the deposition for March 18, 2024. On March 15, 2024, the City served objections to request for production of documents 1-35 contained in the amended deposition notice. Because of the objections, Plaintiff canceled the deposition. On April 10, 2024, Plaintiff served a second amended deposition notice setting the deposition on April 23, 2024. The notice asked the City to produce documents responsive to the request for production of documents by April 16, 2024. On April 19, 2024, the City served objections to request for production of document numbers 1-35 contained in Plaintiffs second amended deposition notice. As a result, Plaintiff canceled the deposition. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff served a third amended deposition notice setting the deposition on May 16, 2024. The notice asked the City to produce documents responsive to the request for production of documents by May 9, 2024. The City did not serve responsive documents and Plaintiff canceled the deposition. Plaintiff now moves to compel the City to produce documents responsive to request for production of documents numbers 1-35 contained in the deposition notices, arguing the City served improper objections to the requests. In response, the City argues that it previously responded to identical requests for production of documents on May 2, 2023 and August 22, 2023. (See Opposition p. 4 [City asserts, The 35 requests were identical and duplicative to plaintiffs requests for production of documents, set 1 initially propounded in 2023].) In its supplemental brief, the City acknowledges that Plaintiffs request for production of documents numbers 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 19, 25, 26, 31, and 32 in the deposition notice are not duplicative of plaintiffs previous request for production of documents. (Supplemental Brief p. 1.) The City asserts that documents responsive to these requests are not in its possession, custody, or control. In his reply, Plaintiff argues that the document production requests in the deposition notices are are unique from that which [Plaintiff] requested in 2023. (Reply p. 5.) Plaintiff also contends that the City did not assert objections based on the duplicative nature of the document requests but instead raised that argument for the first time in a May 21, 2024 meet and confer letter. The Court has reviewed the parties submissions and grants Plaintiffs motion in part. Request for production numbers 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33, and 34 in the third amended deposition notice do not duplicate requests for production contained in Plaintiffs request for production of documents, set one. Therefore, the Court orders the City to provide further, code-compliant responses to these requests for production in the third amended deposition notice. The Court also orders the City to provide further responses to requests for production numbers 5, 6, 8, 13, 16, 19, 25, 26, 31, 32, and 35 in the third amended deposition notice. With respect to these document requests, the City states that No responsive documents are in the defendant Citys possession, custody or control. This response does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230. The Court denies Plaintiff's and the City's requests for sanctions. CONCLUSION The GRANTS in part Plaintiff Khloe Lopezs motion to compel the deposition of Defendant City of Pomonas person most knowledgeable, to compel Defendant City of Pomonas responses to requests for production of documents, and for sanctions. The Court orders Defendant City of Pomona to provide further responses to request for production numbers 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35 in the third amended deposition notice within 30 days of the hearing on this motion and at least 7 days before the deposition of Defendant City of Pomona's person most knowledgeable. The Court orders Defendant City of Pomona to produce its person most knowledgeable for deposition within 37 days of the hearing on this motion. In all other respects, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Khloe Lopezs motion. The Court denies Defendant City of Pomonas request for sanctions. Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Ruling

XIAOLING MAI VS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |20STCV14705

Case Number: 20STCV14705 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the petitioning papers, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On April 16, 2020, Plaintiff Xiaoling Mai (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants County of Los Angeles (County), City of Industry (City), Ramon Ochoa Franco, and Does 1-10 for motor vehicle tort, general negligence, and premises liability (dangerous condition of public property). On November 30, 2020, the City filed an answer. On December 1, 2020, the Court dismissed the County with prejudice at Plaintiffs request. On March 2, 2021, the City filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Ramon Ochoa Franco and Roes 1-10 for equitable indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief. On March 24, 2021, Ramon Ochoa (erroneously sued and served as Ramon Ochoa Franco) (Ochoa) filed an answer to Plaintiffs complaint and a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants City and Roes 1-20 for indemnity and contribution. On April 21, 2021, the City filed an answer to Ochoas cross-complaint. On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement. On July 19, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiffs request to appoint Yu Mai as Plaintiffs guardian ad litem. On November 21, 2023, the Court granted the Citys motion for a good faith settlement determination. On December 22, 2023, Petitioner Yu Mai (Petitioner) filed a petition to approve the compromise of Plaintiffs claim, to be heard on January 17, 2024. The Court continued the hearing to March 7, 2024. On March 7, 2024, the Court issued a ruling and continued the hearing to April 24, 2024. On March 21, 2024, Lilit Movsesyan, as trustee of the Xiaoling Mai special needs trust, filed a bond. On April 9, 2024, Plaintiffs counsel filed a declaration stating that counsels office had recently discovered that Plaintiff may have government-related liens. Counsel asked the Court to continue the hearing scheduled for April 24, 2024 for approximately sixty days to allow counsel to investigate the newly discovered government-related liens. Afterward, counsel would file an amended petition. On April 11, 2024, the Court continued the hearing on the petition to July 15, 2024. On June 17, 2024, Petitioner filed an amended petition to approve the compromise of Plaintiffs case. On July 15, 2024, the Court continued the hearing to August 20, 2024 to allow the Courts Probate Legal Unit to review the amended special needs trust instrument. No trial date is currently scheduled. PETITIONERS REQUEST Petitioner Yu Mai asks the Court to approve the compromise of the pending action of Plaintiff Xiaoling Mai, including placement of the net settlement proceeds in a special needs trust. DISCUSSION A. The amended petition Petitioner has submitted an amended petition asking the Court to approve the placement of the net settlement proceeds into a special needs trust for Plaintiffs benefit. Section 12a(1) of the amended petition states that Plaintiffs total medical expenses were $783,881.79. Section 12a(3) of the amended petition states that the total amount of negotiated, statutory, and contractual reductions was $384,425.08. The difference between these two amounts -- $399,456.71 -- is the amount of medical expenses that should be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. However, Section 12a(4) of the amended petition states that only $91,910.17 of the medical expenses will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. As a result, $307,546.54 of the medical expenses are unaccounted for. Section 12a(2) of the amended petition states that $307,546.54 in medical expenses were paid, including payments by private insurance, Medi-Cal, or Medicare. But the petition does not show how these medical expenses will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. These medical expenses are not included in Section 12a(3), which suggests that the medical providers who charged these expenses have not waived or reduced them. Section 12b(5)(b) of the amended petition contains information about medical providers including the amounts they charged, amounts paid, negotiated reductions, and amounts to be paid from proceeds of settlement. The amounts charged, when added together, are $828,881.79, which is different from the figure provided for total medical expenses before any reductions ($783,881.79) in Section 12a(1) of the amended petition. It is unclear why the figures are different. Counsels declaration asserts that (1) Blue Shield has agreed to accept $80,000.00 as full satisfaction of its lien and reimbursement for medical expenses paid, (2) San Gabriel Valley Medical Center has agreed to accept $3,319.73 as full satisfaction of its lien, (3) Allied Pacific of California IPA/Network Medical Management has agreed to accept $8,590.44 as full satisfaction of its lien and reimbursement for medical expenses paid. These amounts total $91,910.17, the amount that Section 12a(4) of the amended petition lists as the amount to be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. Petitioner should explain (1) whether the figure for total reductions in Section 12a(4) of the amended petition ($384,425.08) is accurate and (2) why the figure provided in Section 12a(1) for total medical expenses before any reductions ($783,881.79) is different from the total amounts charged listed in Section 12b(5)(b) ($828,881.79). The Court cannot approve a petition unless it shows that all the medical expenses that have not been waived or reduced will be paid or reimbursed from the settlement proceeds. B. Special needs trust 1. Notice to State agencies When seeking approval of a special needs trust (SNT), the petitioner must give notice of the hearing and serve the petition on three State agencies: the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Developmental Services, and the Department of Health Care Services. (Prob. Code, §§ 3602, subd. (f), 3611, subd. (c).) Petitioner has not provided a notice of hearing with proof of service on the State agencies for the amended petition. Proof of service of the original petition is not sufficient. The Court will continue the hearing to allow Petitioner to provide the State agencies the required 15 days mailed notice. 2. Purpose of SNT Petitioner proposes to fund the entire net settlement amount into a SNT. A SNT is used to receive settlement funds to prevent the plaintiff from losing eligibility for Medi-Cal, SSI, and other benefits. Historically, a person receiving Medi-Cal or SSI benefits could have only up to $2,000 in non-exempt assets, and any additional non-exempt assets over $2,000 would cause the loss of benefits eligibility under the relevant federal and state law. Funds held in a valid SNT, however, are exempt assets that do not count toward the $2,000 asset limit for purposes of calculating benefits eligibility. On January 1, 2024, the Medi-Cal asset qualification limit was eliminated and there is no longer a means test for Medi-Cal. The asset qualification for other benefits, like SSI, did not change and therefore there might remain a reason for creation and funding of a SNT to maintain other benefits. 3. The proposed trust instrument The main requirements for court-created or funded trusts are set forth at California Rules of Court, rule 7.903(c), and LASC rule 4.116(b). The proposed trust instrument meets those requirements and is ready for approval for creation and/or funding. Petitioner has already signed the trust instrument (as indicated in the instrument attached to the current petition) and a bond has been provided. However, both are improper because the Court has not approved the creation and funding of the trust or made an order requiring a bond. Petitioner should advise the Court if the trustee has taken any action as trustee (including funding of the trust) prior to authorization. Petitioner may execute the trust instrument after the Court issues an order approving the petition. 4. Trustees investment authority Petitioner requests authority for the trustee to invest in proprietary funds, mutual funds, and bonds with maturity dates greater than five years to provide for diversification and a higher rate of investment return. The Court grants the request. 5. Probate Code section 3604, subdivision (b), findings The Court finds: " The SNT beneficiary has a disability which substantially impairs the individuals ability to provide for her own care or custody and constitutes a substantial handicap; " The SNT beneficiary is likely to have special needs that will not be met without the trust; " The money to be paid to the trust does not exceed the amount that appears reasonably necessary to meet the SNT beneficiarys special needs. 6. Trustee and bond The proposed initial trustee is Lilit Movsesyan, a private professional fiduciary (PPF) in Glendale, California. Normally, bond is required of a trustee unless the trustee is a corporate fiduciary. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.903(c)(5); Prob. Code, § 2320.) A PPF does not meet that definition and bond is required. Petitioner calculates and requests a $75,340.26 bond. That calculation appears to be correct based on the assets to be funded into the trust, plus anticipated annual income from investments and any annuity, plus an additional amount required for the costs of any recovery on the bond. The Court requires the trustee to submit a $75,340.26 bond to this Department once the Court approves the compromise of Plaintiffs case. (The bond will later be resubmitted to the Probate Court in any trust supervision action.) 7. Proposed order Petitioner should correct the bond amount listed in the proposed order. Petitioner should change the first accounting due date in the proposed order from May 7, 2025 to a date in October 2025. Petitioner should revise the proposed order to require the filing of a Notice of Commencement of Proceedings for a Court Supervised Trust on LASC Form PRO 044 within 60 days. CONCLUSION The Court CONTINUES the hearing on Petitioner Yu Mai's petition to approve the compromise of Plaintiff Xiaoling Mais action to a date to be provided at the August 20, 2024 hearing. Before the continued hearing date, Petitioner Yu Mai is ordered to: " Serve notice of hearing with proof of service on the three state agencies. (See Section B1 above.) " Submit a revised petition addressing the issues discussed in Section A above. " Submit a revised proposed order addressing the issues discussed in Section B7 above. " Advise the Court whether the trustee has funded the trust and taken other actions as a trustee prior to the Courts approval of the petition. (Section B3 above.) Petitioner is ordered to give notice of this ruling. Petitioner is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

Ruling

BRAD BELLO VS FRANCISCO JOSE MAISCH

Aug 20, 2024 |Renee C. Reyna |20STCV15518

Case Number: 20STCV15518 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 29 Bello v. Maisch 20STCV15518 Defendants Motion for Terminating Sanctions Tentative The motion is denied without prejudice. Background This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on April 25, 2018, involving Plaintiff Brad Bello (Plaintiff) and Defendant Francisco Jose Maisch (Defendant). Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on April 23, 2020, against Defendant and Does 1 through 30, asserting one cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. Defendant filed his answer on November 19, 2021. On April 28, 2023, the Court granted the motion of Plaintiffs counsel to be relieved. Since that time, Plaintiff has been representing himself. On April 3, 2024, Defendant filed motions to compel Plaintiff to respond to form interrogatories and special interrogatories. Plaintiff was served by mail but did not oppose the motions. On May 28, 2024, the motions were granted, and Defendant was ordered to give notice. Defendant gave notice by email. Plaintiff did not respond as ordered. (Mittskus Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendant filed this motion for terminating, issue, evidence, and/or monetary sanctions on July 24. Defendant served Plaintiff by email. No opposition has been filed. Legal Standard When a plaintiff fails to obey an order compelling answers to interrogatories, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c).) To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose the following sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process: ... (d) The court may impose a terminating sanction &." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030.) Misuses of the discovery process include, but are not limited to, the following: ... (d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery. ... (g) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010.) The Civil Discovery Act provides for an escalating and incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination. (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604.) Discovery sanctions should be appropriate to and commensurate with the misconduct, and they should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied discovery. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992.) If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 279-280.) Terminating sanctions should be used sparingly. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal. App. 4th 486, 496.) Although in extreme cases a court has the authority to order a terminating sanction as a first measure, a terminating sanction should generally not be imposed until the court has attempted less severe alternatives and found them to be unsuccessful and/or the record clearly shows lesser sanctions would be ineffective. (Lopez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 604.) But where discovery violations are willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Repeated and willful violations of discovery orders that prejudice the opposing party may warrant a terminating sanction. (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702; Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390; Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327; Lang v. Hachman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246; Collisson X Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622.) The primary purpose of discovery sanctions is to obtain compliance with the Civil Discovery Act and the Courts orders. It is not to punish. (Newland v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 613; Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262.) A discovery sanction should not create a windfall for a party or place a party in a better position than it would have been if the opposing party had simply complied with its obligations under the Courts orders and the Civil Discovery Act. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1194; see also 2 Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), ¶¶ 8:2214-2220.) Discussion Defendant requests terminating sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, and monetary sanctions from Plaintiff. However, this motion was served on Plaintiff electronically. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (c), a plaintiff representing himself in pro per must consent to electronic service: An unrepresented party may consent to receive electronic service& Express consent to electronic service may be given by either of the following: (i) Serving a notice on all parties and filing the notice with the court. (ii) Manifesting affirmative consent through electronic means with the court or the courts electronic filing service provider, and concurrently providing the partys electronic address with that consent for the purpose of receiving electronic service. The act of electronic filing shall not be construed as express consent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (c).) Nothing has been filed with the Court to show Plaintiffs consent of electronic service in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6, subdivision (c). Accordingly, Defendants motion is DENIED without prejudice. Conclusion Defendant Francisco Jose Maischs motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED without prejudice. Moving Party is ordered to give notice.

Ruling

ELIZABETH E. BENCE VS CITY OF SANTA CLARITA

Aug 21, 2024 |23CHCV00510

Case Number: 23CHCV00510 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: F47 Dept. F-47 Date: 8/21/24 TRIAL DATE: 1/27/25 Case #23CHCV00510 MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES (Form Interrogatories, Set 1) Motion filed on 12/29/23. MOVING PARTY: Defendant City of Santa Clarita RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Elizabeth E. Bence NOTICE: ok RELIEF REQUESTED: An order compelling Plaintiff Elizabeth E. Bence to provide a further response to Form Interrogatories, Set 1, No.2.3. Additionally, Defendant requests sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs attorney of record in the amount of $1,527.50. RULING: The motion is granted, in part, and denied, in part. SUMMARY OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY This action arises out Plaintiff Elizabeth E. Bences (Plaintiff) claim that she sustained injuries when she tripped and fell over a raise in the sidewalk at Meadow Heights Court in the City Santa Clarita. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint alleges a cause of action against Defendant City of Santa Clarita (Defendant/City) for dangerous condition of public property under Government Code 835 and a cause of action against City employees under Government Code 840.2. Plaintiff seeks damages for her claimed medical injuries and damages allegedly caused from the fall. On 10/12/23, Defendant served Plaintiff with Form Interrogatories, Set 1. (Marr Decl., Ex.1). On 11/13/23, Plaintiff served responses to the interrogatories which included only objections to Form Interrogatory 2.3. (Id., Ex.2). Meet and confer efforts failed to resolve the issues Defendant had with Plaintiffs response to Form Interrogatory 2.3. (Marr Decl., Ex.4-5). Therefore, on 12/29/23, Defendant filed and served the instant motion which seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to provide a further response to Form Interrogatories, Set 1, No.2.3. Additionally, Defendant requests sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs attorney of record in the amount of $1,527.50. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and Defendant has filed a reply to the opposition. ANALYSIS The scope of discovery is broad allowing a party to obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the action or to the determination of any motion therein, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. CCP 2017.010. If a party which propounded interrogatories finds the responses to be deficient, including that an objection is without merit or too general, it may file a motion to compel further responses. CCP 2030.300(a)(3). Once a timely motion to compel further responses is filed, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify its objections. Williams (2017) 3 C5th 531, 541-542; Fairmount Insurance Co. (2000) 22 C4th 245, 255; Coy (1962) 58 C2d 210, 220-221. Here, Form Interrogatory 2.3 asks Plaintiff whether she had a drivers license at the time of the incident/fall and, if she did, to state: the state or other issuing entity, the license number and type, the date of issuance and all restrictions. In response to the interrogatory, Plaintiff stated that because this case does not involve an automobile accident, Plaintiff objects to the interrogatory on the grounds that it is overbroad, burdensome, and constitutes and [sic] invasion of privacy and not calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. The opposition to the motion focuses on the privacy portion of the objection. To establish that the information sought invades her right to privacy, Plaintiff must show: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (3) a serious invasion of that right. See Hill (1994) 7 C4th 1, 39-40; Loder (1997) 14 C4th 846, 893. Plaintiff fails to meet this burden. Rather, Plaintiff merely concludes, without applying the law to the facts of this case, that information related to Plaintiffs drivers license, is protected by Plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy. (See Opposition, p.1:25-26, p.2:24-p.4:22). However, it has been held that [i]nformation contained on a drivers license does not give rise to a persons reasonable expectation of privacy. Drivers licenses are displayed routinely for purposes of identification. People v. Herrera (1981) 124 CA3d 386, 389. Additionally, a response to the interrogatory may establish restrictions, limitations, or revocation of Plaintiffs drivers license which relates to Plaintiffs physical and cognitive condition. In this action, Plaintiff claims physical and cognitive impairment from traumatic brain injuries following the fall. Information regarding preexisting conditions, which may be discerned from a proper response to Form Interrogatory 2.3, is relevant to causation and damages. As such, the information sought in Form Interrogatory 2.3 meets the relevance standard set forth in CCP 2017.010. As shown in the reply, Defendant has attempted to obtain Plaintiffs drivers license and the information sought in Form Interrogatory 2.3 through other means without success. (See Reply, p.2:16-p.3:6, p.3:20-26; Marr Reply Decl.). Defendants request for sanctions is denied because it does not comply with the requirements set forth in CCP 2023.040 which provides: A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought. Here, the notice of motion requests sanctions against Plaintiff and/or Plaintiffs attorney of record without identifying the specific attorney against whom the sanctions are sought as required by CCP 2023.040. (See Motion, p.2:7-10). The responses to the Form Interrogatories were signed by attorney Krystale Rosal of Fiore Legal, Inc. who also responded to Defendants meet and confer letter and prepared the opposition to the motion. However, Plaintiffs attorney of record in eCourt is listed as Mauro Fiore of the Law Offices of Mauro Fiore. As such, it is not clear against whom the sanctions are sought. CONCLUSION The request for an order compelling Plaintiff to provide a further response to Form Interrogatory 2.3 is granted. A further responses is due within 15 days. The request for sanctions is denied.

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COMPLAINT July 17, 2020 (2025)

FAQs

What happens if you fail to respond to a complaint? ›

Whether in state court, federal court or arbitration forums, a defendant in a civil action who does not file a response to the complaint against them within the time set forth by law effectively forfeits their right to defend the action.

How many days to file an answer to a complaint in CA? ›

Generally, you have 30 days AFTER the date you are served to file a response with the court. The 30 days include weekend days and court holidays.

What must you never do when dealing with a complaint? ›

Failing to follow up with the customer, ignoring or dismissing the complaint, or acting as if it isn't worthy of addressing. Making excuses, deflecting, or laying the blame back on the customer, management, or another department.

How long should I wait for a response to a complaint? ›

The experience of customers in other sectors shows that a response within two working days increases their confidence in a complaint handling process.

What not to do when responding to a complaint? ›

Table of Contents
  1. Don't Be Confrontational.
  2. Don't Get Defensive.
  3. Don't Take the Complaint Lightly.
  4. Don't Dismiss Their Concerns.
  5. Don't Write a Complicated Response.
  6. Don't Delete Complaints.
  7. Don't Alter Content.
  8. Don't Acknowledge or Repeat PHI.
Dec 1, 2021

How do I end an answer to a complaint? ›

You should conclude your answer with a "wherefore clause". For example, In the example above, Defendant's conclusion should read as follows: "Wherefore Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint and that Plaintiff recovers nothing."

Do I need to answer an amended complaint? ›

Code of Civil Procedure section 471.5 requires a defendant to answer1 an amended complaint within 30 days after service.

What are the consequences of not dealing with complaints? ›

But, if you have a lot of customer complaints that are continually ignored, that poor customer service will impact your business in the following ways:
  • Loss of profits.
  • Loss of return business.
  • Loss of customer loyalty.
  • Loss of referral business.
  • Loss of reputation.

What happens if you sue a company and they dont respond? ›

You Can Lose By Default:

If you don't file a response 30 days after you were served, the Plaintiff can file a form called “Request for Default”. The Plaintiff has to wait 30 days to file this. If the Plaintiff files this form, the Court can enter a judgment against you.

What is the danger to the defendant in failing to answer a complaint? ›

A default means that you failed to answer the complaint in the time required by law. If a default is entered against you, you CANNOT defend yourself in the case. WARNING: a judgment against you could show on your credit report and result in a wage garnishment or other means of collection.

What happens if you don't reply to a summons? ›

If you don't, the plaintiff can ask for a default. If there's a default, the court won't let you file an Answer and can decide the case without you.

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